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II. Abstract 
As climate change becomes an increasingly devastating issue it seems as if concern 
dwindles just as severely. Climate change lends itself so readily to apathy, but why? The 
overarching goal of this paper is to figure out the answer to a seemingly simple question: why do 
people have such a difficult time understanding and acting on climate change? The process of 
answering this question is a bit more complicated, and for the scope of this paper, the process is 
twofold. First, I aim to uncover the psychological barriers that prevent climate change response. 
Discussion of these psychological barriers includes insights from multiple schools of 
psychology, as well as a summation of these barriers into “The Five D’s,” which are Distance, 
Doom, Denial, Dissonance, and iDentity. Second, I explore how these barriers inform climate 
change communication. By strategically bypassing these barriers with different communication 
strategies – Social, Supportive, Simple, Story-based, and Signals – better climate change 
communication can be achieved. Additionally, this paper features a small-scale survey assessing 
potential trends in psychological barriers to response. Results from both literature review and the 
survey overwhelmingly indicate the need to move away from communicating climate change as 
an abstract, looming, global issue, and to communicate it at a personal level and in a way that 
encourages action. 
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III. Introduction  
Background 
Although the worst effects of climate change can be seen in coastal communities, regions 
with warm climates, and developing countries, people in these locations, who are often people of 
color and come from low socioeconomic backgrounds, generally contribute the least to climate 
change (Busch, 2015) Those who are experiencing the most severe impacts of climate change are 
often without the resources needed to mitigate those impacts, and often have much more urgent 
issues to deal with, such as food security and clean water. Climate change is an inherently 
privileged issue to be able to do something about. Yet, those with enough comfort in their daily 
lives to act on climate change are some of the hardest people to convince of the severity and 
urgency of the issue – those who are already affected live with the direct impacts daily. With that 
being said, most of the research in this paper pertains to the United States and the European 
Union, who just so happen to be two of the top carbon emitters (Busch, 2015). So, while it is a 
privilege to be able to do something about climate change, it is also a moral and ethical duty.   
Research Question and Objectives  
 In the first week of my study abroad program, my class was given lecture titled “Time, 
Hope, and Climate Change” by Dr. Guðni Elísson. While the title holds true to the topic of 
discussion, the lecture also contained so much more. Dr. Elísson encouraged climate change to 
be a conversation. He stressed that technology – especially renewables – is not the only answer. 
He warned us that, although there is enough time to make a better future for our planet, we are 
far too optimistic, and we need to take off our rose-colored glasses in order to see any beneficial 
change. We walked away from Dr. Elísson’s lecture feeling helpless and discouraged, yet also 
empowered enough to save the world. Among the many messages Dr. Elísson shared with us that 
day, the most pervasive was that people do not care about climate change because climate 
change is almost impossible to care about. This swam around in my subconscious until it came 
time to draft our ISP proposals and I still had no idea why climate change lends itself so well to 
apathy. So, a research question was born: why do people have such a difficult time 
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understanding and acting on climate change? With time, this question grew into a project with 
three main goals: determine what psychological barriers exist to climate change response, learn 
how understanding those barriers can inform better climate change communication, and conduct 
a small-scale survey assessing barriers to response and potential trends. 
 For this paper, climate change response encompasses a large range of both thoughts and 
actions. Response includes anything “from planning by federal and state officials, to 
social movement activity, to individual behavioral change, or even acknowledging the 
information by letting it cross our minds or talking about it with friends and family” (World 
Bank, 2009). Better climate change communication includes any sort of communication 
techniques that more effectively communicate climate change that what is already being done.   
Justification 
 For there to be any chance at truly mitigating climate change, there absolutely needs 
heightened global concern. It is a matter of ethics and morality, and of fostering a livable 
environment for all living beings and for generations to come. Scientific consensus states crystal 
clear that climate change is the most important environmental issue of our time, and that inaction 
will almost certainly transform Earth into something fundamentally unlivable. Yet, we are still 
marching along the business-as-usual path as if our shoes were not wet with rising tides, as if our 
lungs were not filled with ash. So, why do people not care? And how do you get them to care? 
Without the answers to those questions, progress seems futile and hope for the future seems 
foolish.   
IV. Psychological Barriers to Response 
Introduction 
 This section provides an overview of psychological barriers to climate change response 
from the lenses of four different disciplines of psychology: evolutionary psychology, cognitive 
psychology, social psychology, and cultural identity psychology. While these four disciplines do 
not provide an exhaustive understanding of climate change response from a psychological 
perspective, they do lay the groundwork for a sturdy base of knowledge. 
 Katz 5 
 Climate change psychology is an emerging field – most of the literature hails from the 
last decade and a half. The bulk of my research stems from psychologist and climate activist Per 
Espen Stoknes’ book What We Think About When We Try Not To Think About Global Warming. 
The format of his book worked incredibly well for the goals of my research. Additionally, since 
the field of climate psychology is so small and new, his book highlights a great deal of the most 
noteworthy and influential research in the field.  
Evolutionary Psychology 
Evolutionary psychology tells us that humans are primarily worried about “self-interest, 
status, and imitation of others,” (Stoknes, 2015). From these categories, there are five key issues 
that help explain people’s lack of response to climate change. These issues are: the desire to pass 
on our genes, flock status, imitation, short-termism, and risk perception.  
Humans are very self-interested animals. From an evolutionary standpoint, one of our 
main goals is survival. This includes our own survival, as well as passing on our genes to ensure 
the continued survival of our species. When faced with a challenge, whether it be hunting for 
food or deciding whether to drive or bike to work, people are most likely to make “short-term 
selfish choices” (Stoknes, 2015). The easiest decision or the one with the most immediate reward 
will often be the decision made, even if that decision harms other people or the environment. 
Additionally, mankind’s selfish tendencies may also help explain the general lack of interest in 
climate change issues. If an issue does not directly affect a person, their family, their friends, 
their town, or anything else in their immediate social vicinity, then it does not make sense to 
prioritize that issue when there are more proximate, pressing issues (Stoknes, 2015). 
Consequently, if an issue does not directly affect a person, then it does not directly affect our 
“moral intuitions” (Gilbert, 2006). While humans are likely to act on issues that challenges our 
personal morals and ethical beliefs, “chemicals in the atmosphere do not make us angry or 
repulsed” (Gilbert, 2006). 
 Continuing with the idea that humans are mostly concerned about themselves and their 
immediate surroundings is the concept of flock status. This term describes an animal’s instinct to 
flaunt their bodies to impress other animals in their flock and thus gain higher status as a member 
of that flock. According to Stoknes, “Humans aren’t that different. But rather than simply 
dancing proudly with what we’ve got, we moderns buy feathers and colors and dresses and cars 
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and boats and large houses and countless other things to display how big our own playground is” 
(Stoknes, 2015). This becomes a climate change issue when gaining relative, short-term status in 
one’s community overrides efforts to combat climate change. An example of this would be 
buying a fancy sports car to impress neighbors instead of driving a more eco-friendly car, taking 
public transportation, or another mode of lower-carbon transportation.  
 Imitation is another important player in the field of evolutionary psychology. Humans are 
fantastic at learning from imitation, but that is contingent upon what the majority is doing. If 
there is not a “majority already behaving responsibility that I can imitate,” then people will 
assume that those “responsible” efforts are not worth doing (Stoknes, 2015). If nobody else is 
composting, then why should I? The reverse mentality is just as, if not more harmful. If there a 
majority already behaving irresponsibly, then people will be more inclined to imitate those 
behaviors. If everyone else buys plastic water bottles, then I should too. 
 As I have already discussed, humans are wired to think in the short-term, and climate 
change is the opposite of a short-term issue. The effects of climate change are on the order of 
decades and centuries, yet “Behavioral psychology says that the optimal time interval for 
learning between a stimulus and response is on the order of one to two seconds” (Stoknes, 2015). 
Humans are “masters at responding to immediate threats, but are novices at acting to resolve 
worries of the distant future” (Gilbert, 2006). This puts climate far outside the scope of what 
humans are likely to care about because it is slow and distant. If climate change is seen as an 
issue at all, it is a very, very low priority.   
The final issue from evolutionary psychology is risk perception. Again, this topic brings 
up matters of immediacy. If a threat is not easily detected by any of our senses, it probably will 
not register as a threat. Humans are incredibly skilled at ducking immediate threats, which means 
immediate threats tend to be emphasized in our brains and thus registered as more severe than 
distant threats (Gilbert, 2006; Stoknes, 2015). Additionally, people see intentional, man-made 
risks as bigger threats than natural, unchosen risks. This is why issues such as “anthrax and 
terrorism” seem much more severe than climate change, since “climate change lacks agency, and 
is instead an emergent property of more nebulous interactions,” even though the predicted risks 
of climate change far outweigh those of anthrax, terrorism, and the like (Gilbert, 2006). New 
risks are also seen as bigger threats than those people have lived with for a while. Since climate 
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change is something people have lived with for quite some time, people have grown used to it, 
and therefore, less afraid of it (Stoknes, 2015).  
Cognitive Psychology 
Cognitive psychology describes how people think and process information. 
Understanding climate change from this viewpoint is imperative for improving climate change 
communication because so much of communication is about getting people to think and process 
information. Distance is the main topic of discussion here. For most people, climate change does 
not hit any buttons in terms of distance. For most people, climate change is distant in both time 
and space, it is distant from our sense of control and from our senses, and it is socially distant as 
well.  
Climate change is not only far away in time, but it is happening very slowly as well. As 
evolutionary psychology tells us, humans are fantastic at perceiving events that occur quickly, 
but are very unskilled at detecting smaller, more incremental changes (Gilbert, 2006). While 
some of the effects of climate change occur incredibly quickly, such as natural disasters, most of 
the effects will happen slowly over a long period of time. Humans also like to take mental 
shortcuts to minimize long-term thinking in order to capitalize on short-term thinking. This 
theory of fast and slow thinking can be attributed to psychologist and economist Daniel 
Kahneman, whose work Stoknes summarizes in his book. Stoknes explains that our fast thinking 
is “a kind of quick-and-dirty thinking based on rules of thumb, habit, gut reactions, and biases,” 
while our slow thinking “is more rational, linear, logical, and cumbersome” (Stoknes, 2015). 
Climate change requires a large emphasis on slow thinking, which makes it such a difficult 
problem to solve because humans love fast thinking. This system of thinking can also be 
described as heuristics, or mental shortcuts. A study done at Columbia University shows the use 
of heuristics with climate change very well. Researchers found people tend to correlate current 
weather patterns with how severe global warming is; this is called the local warming effect. In 
periods of intense warmth, people were more likely to rate climate change as a more severe issue 
(Zaval, Keenan, Johnson, and Weber, 2014). Weather is much more short-term, and much easier 
to identify as opposed to climate, which is why using weather to classify global warming severity 
is an example of heuristics.  
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 For the majority of the human population, climate change is distant in space. The most 
extreme effects of climate change seem to only visible in places that already have extremely cold 
or extremely warm climates, or in small coastal communities and remote islands. While these 
locations are inhabited by humans, the majority of our population resides elsewhere, making the 
current effects of climate change seem incredibly far away. And while it is true that some of the 
most severe impacts of climate change are often occurring far away in distance from most 
people, we have pushed away almost all opportunity to notice the changes happening right 
around us due to our urban way of life. We move through the world in cars, trains, and planes; 
we live, learn, and work in temperature-controlled buildings; we barely spend time in the natural, 
unaltered world (Moser, 2010). This makes it almost impossible to notice any of the smaller 
changes that would be easily detectable in a less urbanized lifestyle. 
Scientists estimate that, even if we stop all global emissions today, the effects of previous 
emissions would still last decades. Knowing that decades of future effects are still imminent even 
in most the extreme case of carbon mitigation does not bode well for optimism. Climate change 
issues often create a sense of helplessness because both the problems and solutions seem largely 
out of our control (Stoknes, 2015).  
Additionally, climate change is distant from our senses. While the effects of climate 
change are visible, the causes are often abstract and invisible (Stoknes, 2015). Carbon does not 
have a color or a scent, and its measurement, parts per million (ppm) is impossible to visualize. 
Similarly, radiative forcing, measured in watts per square meter (W/m2) is equally as abstract.  
Lastly, climate change is socially distant from most people. Politicians are generally the 
ones in charge of writing laws and policies that would lead to large-scale climate change 
mitigation. The average person likely does not know these politicians, and likely does not know 
how to easily access these politicians, either. So, climate change is also socially inaccessible.  
Social Psychology 
Social psychology helps us understand how people interact with and influence each other, 
specifically looking at thoughts, feelings, and behaviors (Stoknes, 2015). Subjects discussed in 
this section are performance and social attention, social roles, attitudes, cognitive dissonance, 
and single action bias.  
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Social attention is one of the most powerful behavioral motivators. The presence of 
others has the potential to highly impact and motivate an individual's actions (Stoknes, 2015). 
This explains why people worry so much about what others think or why it is so much easier to 
stick to an exercise routine when others do it, too. In the climate change realm, this translates to 
not sharing an article about carbon emissions because you are worried other people will not like 
it, or to working as a community to lower electricity usage because it is easier as a group. 
The social roles people play in their lives also contribute to how they interact with 
climate change issues. The biggest juxtaposition exists between scientists and ordinary people. It 
is difficult for people to break these roles in order to understand how people in other roles 
receive information to therefore communicate information properly. The way scientists tend to 
communicate data is very cut-and-dry, which is not conducive to social interaction or to forming 
personal meaning (Stoknes, 2015). When scientists are in their scientist roles, they often assume 
others look at data logically and rationally just as they do. Scientists often assume the ordinary 
person is able to extrapolate meaning from graphs just as they do. This leads to the ordinary 
person struggling to interact with climate data, thus disregarding climate issues entirely (Stoknes, 
2015). Perhaps the most obvious examples of this communication failure due to social roles are 
the IPCC reports, which are written almost entirely as a series of facts, devoid of social discourse 
(Stoknes, 2015).   
Social psychology also describes how attitudes are linked to lack of climate change 
response. Attitudes are comprised of three components, illustrated by the ABC-model. The A 
stands for the affective/emotion component, the B for the behavioral component, and the C for 
the cognitive component. Attitudes may be implicit or explicit, and both influence our behaviors 
and opinions (Stoknes, 2015). When our knowledge clashes with our attitudes is when cognitive 
dissonance sets in. Cognitive dissonance occurs when what we do does not align with what we 
know or believe, and vice versa. Stoknes explains that many people want to be able to change 
their behaviors to better the planet, but oftentimes are not motivated enough or do not have the 
resources to do so. People fix this dissonance by creatively changing their thinking around the 
topic to make themselves feel better. There are four main strategies people use to cope with 
cognitive dissonance, which include adjusting their perception of reality (my neighbor drives 
more than I do, my impact does not matter in comparison!), reducing the severity of the issue 
(evidence that driving is bad for the environment is weak anyway!), adding in more excuses (I 
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recycle and compost so it evens out!), and denying all evidence outright (climate change is not 
real, it is all just propaganda!) (Stoknes, 2015).  
A final instance of how people use excuses to make themselves feel better about their 
environmental impact is called the single-action bias. The single-action bias is when people do 
one thing, such as buying a hybrid car, then feel as if they have done their part in combating 
climate change (Climate One, 2013). A study done by researchers at the University of Toronto 
found that people who were exposed to green products acted more altruistically than those who 
were only exposed to regular products, but that people who bought green products acted less 
altruistically and were more likely to steal or cheat than those who were just exposed to those 
products (Mazar and Zhong, 2010). This is a prime example of how a single environmentally 
friendly action makes people think that they have done enough.  
Cultural Identity Psychology 
Cultural identity psychology deals with beliefs, decisions, and behaviors that are shared 
between a group of people. These groups may be formed around identities people are born with, 
such as race, ethnicity, or generation, or around less permanent identities such as profession, 
hobbies, or interests. In terms of climate change issues, cultural identity psychology provides a 
discussion on confirmation bias, worldviews, and denial.  
Confirmation bias is a way of thinking in which people seek out, or more readily accept 
information that aligns with their existing beliefs (Stoknes, 2015). This is deeply affected by our 
worldviews, which are strongly connected to our cultural identities (Stoknes, 2015). One of the 
most prominent examples of this bias is the way in which climate change has become a partisan 
issue in the United States. A study was done in 2011 to determine if political ideology played a 
role in whether or not people believed expert scientists agreed about the causes and existence of 
climate change. Researchers found that the 68% of liberals believed there was consensus among 
expert scientists, and only 20% believed scientists were still divided. On the other hand, 55% of 
conservatives believed that expert scientists were divided on climate change issues, and another 
32% of conservatives believed that most expert scientists disagreed with climate change in its 
totality (Kahan, Jenkins-Smith, and Braman, 2011). Sometimes a person’s willingness to believe 
in an issue has less to do with the actual science itself and more to do with the identities that 
person holds. And sometimes theses biases become even more pervasive and become associated 
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not just with independent ideas, but with opposing social groups. This is called the cultural 
cognition thesis and can make communicating climate messages even more challenging (Kahan, 
2015). Oftentimes, scientific consensus does not even have enough power to override 
worldviews and selective assessment of data, as evidenced by US politics (Lewandowsky, 
Gignac, and Vaughan, 2012).  
 Both confirmation biases and worldviews feed into climate denial. Denial is a defense 
mechanism used to avoid confronting a troublesome truth, and there are a myriad of reasons why 
a person might deny climate change, either actively or passively. In most cases, however, denial 
stems from worldviews. As Stoknes writes, “Many conservatives don’t oppose climate science 
because they are ignorant. Rather, it is a way of expressing who they are” (Stoknes, 2015). In 
fact, “The strongest predictor of expressing climate change denial is having a libertarian, free-
market worldview” (Stoknes, 2015). It does not help that denial is often corporately funded, 
driven by policy groups and the like (Stoknes, 2015). Additionally, the more you push against 
denial, the worse it gets – being accused of denial only works to build up stronger defenses, 
rather than break them down (Stoknes, 2015).  
Summary of Barriers - The Five D’s 
The first section Stoknes’ book, which looks at climate change from four different 
schools of psychology, concludes with a summary of what exactly holds people back from taking 
action. Here, Stoknes proposes five psychological barriers to climate change response, which he 
calls “The Five D’s” (Stoknes, 2015). They are Distance, Doom, Dissonance, Denial, and 
iDentity. The Five D’s can be visualized as concentric circles around an individual acting as 
different levels of defense against climate change information.  
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Figure 1. The Five D’s visualized as concentric circles around the individual (Stoknes, 2015). 
 
Distance is the most multifaceted barrier, as it includes distance in time, distance in 
space, distance from our sense of control, distance from our senses, and social distance. Doom is 
a bit simpler and focuses mainly on whether people are optimistic or pessimistic about the future 
of our planet. Dissonance is when our actions do not align with our beliefs, such as buying 
single-use plastic water bottles even though you know reusable bottles are better for the 
environment. Denial is a very straightforward barrier – this happens when people refuse to 
acknowledge or believe the severity of the problem. Lastly, there is iDentity, which includes all 
aspects of how our identities influence the way we interact with climate change issues. These 
barriers have their roots in the four schools of psychology previously addressed and together 
provide a comprehensive view on climate change attitudes.  
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V. How Barriers Inform Communication 
Introduction 
 Climate change communication saw its start in the 1980s. Like today, most of these 
communications were based in scientific facts and figures and had little to do with social 
discourse. These communications quickly garnered backlash from pro-carbon players, which 
lead to climate change becoming a partisan issue, as well as additional misunderstanding, 
misinformation, sensationalist media, and cultural denial. The backlash garnered attention as 
well, and climate activism spread. Both despite of and because of this back-and-forth cycle, 
climate change communications today do not look all that different (Moser, 2010). If the average 
person is informed at all about climate change, their level of knowledge generally remains 
superficial and highly influenced by the confusing dichotomy of messages, and as time goes on, 
this confusion only grows worse (Kahan, 2015; Moser, 2010). The science communication 
paradox explains “the simultaneous increase in knowledge and conflict over what’s known” 
(Kahan, 2015). Today, more than ever, accurate and successful climate change communication is 
vital to climate change mitigation. 
The goal of this section is to synthesize ideas from psychology and communications to 
gain an understanding of how to better communicate climate change, and therefore how to better 
elicit and encourage response. Just as the previous section did not discuss every piece of 
knowledge psychology tells us about climate change, this section, too, is a simply a starting point 
for further discussion.  
Challenges and Opportunities 
 Susanne Moser, a social scientist focused on climate change adaptation, provides a list of 
essential questions to ask throughout the communication process. Since research on climate 
change communication is so new, many of these questions pull from strategies from other 
communication fields such as risk communication, science communication, and health 
communication (Moser, 2010). The first question asks the communicator to consider the goals, 
both scope and purpose, of the communication. The second asks who the audience is, which is 
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deeply important because communications need to be tailored to specific audiences. 
Additionally, it takes much more effort to reach into groups with distinctly different views than 
those of the communicator, which must be considered. The third question asks how the issue is 
framed. Are there images? Metaphors? All of these questions are important, but perhaps framing 
is the most important part of the actual communication. The fourth question asks what messages 
and information are being communicated, and how that content can be made most useful and 
accessible to the group of people receiving the communication. According to Moser, messages 
must be “internally consistent,” must “tap into or help create mental models for people to make 
sense of the problem and direct them toward a behavioral response,” must “be more than the 
words or the information conveyed,” and must “keep the audience’s attention” (Moser, 2010). 
The fifth question asks the communicator to think about who the messengers are. The person 
doing the communicating has the potential to strongly affect how people respond to the message. 
The relationship between the communicator and the people receiving the communications might 
influence the next question, which asks through which modes the communication occurs. The 
internet, for example, is fantastic for increasing communication, but is also fantastic at 
amplifying divisions among groups which makes it easier for misinformation to spread. The last 
question Moser asks is if the communication was successful in doing what it was intended to do 
(2010).  
 Additionally, both Moser and a team of British researchers list three main purposes for 
climate change communication. These purposes are raising public knowledge and awareness of 
climate change issues, promoting social engagement and community participation, and 
encouraging changes in social norms, cultural values, and behaviors (Moser, 2010; Nerlich, 
Koteyko, and Brown, 2010). 
 Nerlich, Koteyko, and Brown also highlight special challenges and opportunities for local 
organizations, for governments, and for scientists. The researchers point out that local 
organizations have the power to engage people at emotion, personal, and community levels, and 
to promote bottom-up initiatives. Governments have the vast responsibility of communicating 
with an entire nation, and therefore must know how to address many different groups of people, 
need to select key facts and concepts to communicate, and should encourage citizens that there 
are viable solutions. Policymakers also must be consistent and factual in their messaging. For 
scientists, emphasis is placed on the role of language in reports and other scientific 
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communications. For instance, “positive trend” means “upward trend” to a scientist but may 
mean “good trend” to a layperson, which, as we know from climate science, is not always the 
case (Nerlich, Koteyko, and Brown, 2010).  
Communication Strategies - The Five S’s 
Just as Stoknes summarizes the barriers to climate change response in a five-point list, he 
does the same with strategies for climate change communication. These fives strategies are 
Social, Supportive, Simple, Story-Based, and Signals, and correspond to the Five D’s (Stoknes, 
2015). These strategies all revolve around the same goal of positivity, and all approach the Five 
D’s from a proactive, preventative stance, rather than a reactionary, adaptive one.  
 The Social strategy is all about the power of social networks. Instead of viewing social 
influence as a driver for judgement and inaction, it should be utilized for its capacity to drive 
positive change. One exemplary study put up signs in hotel bathrooms to see how simply asking 
someone to reuse towels for conservation’s sake would fare against signs that mentioned how 
almost 75% of other guests reuse their towels. As predicted, the signs depicting social norms 
yielded significantly higher towel reuse rates. Researchers took it a step further and tried out five 
different signs: one about conservation, and the other four with the 75% message but with 
different social identities tacked on (guest identity, same room identity, citizen identity, and 
gender identity). The data showed that the same room identity prevailed, yielding significantly 
higher towel reuse rates than all of the other sign methods (Goldstein, Cialdini, and Griskevicius, 
2008). This application of social norms shows that not only do social norms encourage 
participation, but that they have the potential to work best “when the setting in which those 
norms are formed is comparable to the setting those individuals are currently occupying” 
(Goldstein, Cialdini, and Griskevicius, 2008).  
 Using peer influence to encourage positive change regarding social norms is imperative 
for progress. People are not just going to go green unless they believe others will, too. Stoknes 
points out that “People adjust their behavior to fit the signals sent by their physical surroundings 
about what a neighborhood finds acceptable” (2015). If there is already litter lining the streets of 
a neighborhood, you can bet that people are going to be more likely to continue littering there 
than start littering on a clean street. In the same vein, if an individual knows that all of their 
neighbors are recycling, then that individual is much more likely to recycle than if their 
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neighbors did not all recycle. With this, it is important that the power of social norms is used in a 
positive way. Telling a group of people that “83% of people do not recycle” most likely will not 
be seen as a call to action but will invoke further complacency (Stoknes, 2015). If no one else 
does it, why should I? A summary of two large field experiments on energy consumption and 
reduction showed that, among issues of sustainability, the wellbeing of future generations, saving 
money, and what neighbors are doing, social norms (neighbors) prevail as the most effective 
driver for behavioral change and energy conservation (Ayres, Raseman, and Shih, 2009). As 
evidenced, social norms are extremely powerful.  
 Of course, it is important not to ignore other motivators such as pricing, taxes, and 
technology. Combining social norms and peer pressure with these other motivators could prove 
most effective. Stoknes notes that face-to-face interaction will always be the most powerful tool 
for imparting a long-lasting behavioral impact. He also notes that people are generally much 
more responsive to their peers than to experts. All in all, keeping it local is the best way to enact 
positive, lasting change. Communicators should seek out opportunities for people to become 
excited about making changes in their homes, their friend groups, their neighborhoods, and their 
cities (Stoknes, 2015). 
 The second strategy, Supportive, is focused on reframing the climate message. As 
previously discussed, most climate change communication strategies in the past revolved around 
hard science, data, numbers, and facts – none of which is easily conducive to emotional 
connection. When communicators did attempt to connect people to the issues, oftentimes 
extreme frames of disaster, destruction, uncertainty, costs, high price, loss and sacrifice were 
used (Stoknes, 2015). While these negative frames must have worked on some people (would 
anyone unaffected care about climate change today if they did not?), they are perhaps the worst 
way a communicator could frame a message.  
Instead of framing climate change as a large and looming disaster that will cause mass 
destruction, it should be framed as an issue that will impact individual people, their family, their 
friends, and their hometown. Messages of disaster and destruction on a global scale, a planetary 
scale, an environmental scale, are all too large to be concrete and only act to strengthen people’s 
distance from the topic (Stoknes, 2015). Stoknes recommends stressing that “The health of our 
human lives depends on the vitality of the more-than-human world” (2015). Yes, floods, 
droughts and heat waves will happen, but how will they affect people? Communicators should 
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talk about how lives and health will be put at risk from damaged infrastructure, and how asthma, 
allergies, respiratory diseases, and heat-related deaths will all become more common as climate 
change persists (Stoknes, 2015). Of course, these are all still very scary issues to face, but 
bringing climate change home, framing it as an intensely personal issue will hopefully encourage 
people to act. 
Instead of framing climate change as a cost or a loss, it should be framed as an 
opportunity for insurance. Humans are loss-aversive: we would rather avoid a future loss than 
realize a future gain (Stoknes, 2015).  Just as we have health insurance to make sure we are 
covered if we get sick, climate change should be framed as an opportunity to insure ourselves 
against potential risks in the future.  
Instead of framing climate change as an unknown, uncertain issue, communicators should 
turn this frame around and direct attention toward preparedness and ethics. Scientists may not be 
perfectly certain of what will happen as climate change progresses, but extreme change will 
occur beyond reasonable doubt, so it would be “reckless, unethical, and irresponsible” to not 
prepare for these effects (Stoknes, 2015). Stoknes encourages communicators to make people 
feel morally responsible to act. Additionally, preparedness is much more active than adaptation – 
it is much easier for people to want to prepare for climate change in concrete ways than to try 
and imagine how they will have to adapt to an abstract future. 
Instead of framing climate change as a sacrifice, frame it as an opportunity. For Stoknes, 
he would rather hear about having a cool, new electric car, and that eating fish and veggies and 
biking to work would give him better abs, than he would about giving up his SUV and T-bone 
steaks (Stoknes, 2015). For those who tend to deny climate change, climate change could be 
framed as an opportunity for national defense, free-market competition, property rights, and 
smart, green economic development. Stoknes urges communicators to get people excited about 
the future, not scared. 
 When working to reframe climate change issues, it is imperative that communicators 
“never accept the backfiring frames. Don’t negate them, or repeat them, or structure your 
arguments to counter them. That just activates those frames, thereby strengthening them in the 
audience’s mind” (Stoknes, 2015). Avoid backfiring frames at all costs, and only focus on 
positive ones. 
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 The Simple strategy deals with making it easier to choose green options. Greener options 
need to be affordable, accessible, and presented well. While not related to climate change, organ 
donor policies are a great example of how opt-in versus opt-out policies make a huge difference. 
Austria’s organ-donor policy is opt-out, and 99% of people are donors, whereas Germany, for 
example, has an opt-in policy, and its consent rate is only 12% (Stoknes, 2015). This strategy 
could be applied to climate change issues by making green options the default. Stoknes provides 
a few examples of defaults such as setting the printer to two-sided, having to pay for your share 
of CO2 emissions unless you click an opt-out button at the end of the page, or reducing parking 
spaces and improving public transportation (Stoknes, 2015). The list of “green nudges” that can 
be made by stores, restaurants, and at home is extensive. Stores should advertise the most 
energy-efficient electrical appliances, energy programs should make the green programs the 
default, and recycling bins should be made larger while garbage bins should be made smaller. 
Meals should be served on smaller plates so people take less food at a time, therefore limiting 
food waste. The vegetarian option should not just be labelled the “vegetarian option,” but 
something more appealing to larger audiences such as the “daily special.” Technology 
companies should start selling smart home devices that can track energy use and encourage 
people to be more energy efficient (Stoknes, 2015). Again, all of these strategies focus on 
making climate change issues near and personal and promote positive changes in behavior and 
attitude.  
 The Story-Based strategy is aimed at rewriting the stories of climate hell and imminent 
apocalypse as narratives of human potential and a better future. Climate change stories should be 
positive, believable, and should depict a world people want to live in. Stoknes features four types 
of stories in his book: green growth, wellbeing, stewardship, and rewilding (2015). The green 
growth narrative presents brown growth as a thing of the past, and puts the emphasis on a future 
of smart, green growth and an environmentally friendly world. The wellbeing narrative depicts 
stories of social justice, generosity, and a happy future. It shows that happiness can be found in 
simplicity. It pushes us in a better direction. The stewardship story brings to light issues of 
religion and ethics. Many monotheistic religions feature a disconnect between humans and 
nature, and this story asserts the holiness of nature and attempts to reconnect humans with their 
non-human environment. This story says that the destruction of the planet is sinful, and frames 
 Katz 19 
environmental stewardship as a religious duty. And lastly, the rewilding story, which champions 
nature’s resilience to change (Stoknes, 2015). 
 The fifth and final strategy, Signals, encourages new signals of progress. Gross domestic 
product (GDP) is one of the main markers of progress, but, similar to climate messages of the 
past, does not do enough to incite emotion or to inspire social discourse. New signals need to be 
more meaningful than just numbers, and they need to indicate green growth. Perhaps these new 
signals will show the impact of change over time of economic activity and its impacts on the 
environment. This could be a combination of CO2 emissions, corporation growth, and value 
(Stoknes, 2015). Perhaps this signal could count happiness and wellbeing, or maybe even ethics. 
Additional Strategies  
While Stoknes’ suggestions for climate change communication are quite extensive and do 
cover most of what other climate change communicators are addressing, one additional strategy 
warrants discussion. This strategy is called “inoculation theory,” and is aimed at eradicating 
misinformation. Inoculation theory works by “forewarning people that they may be exposed to 
information that challenges their existing beliefs or behaviors. Then, one or more (weakened) 
examples of that information are presented and directly refuted” (van der Linden, Leiserowitz, 
Rosenthal, and Maibach, 2017). People are inoculated against misinformation just as they are 
given vaccines to prevent diseases After conducting two different studies, researchers concluded 
that inoculation worked, and moreover, “proved equally effective across the political spectrum,” 
which has incredible implications for breaking past worldviews and the partisan nature of 
climate change (van der Linden, Leiserowitz, Rosenthal, and Maibach, 2017).   
Future Directions for Communication 
 Above all, more research needs to be done on all facets of climate change 
communication. There is a lack of empirical data on all elements of the communication process, 
on the use of visual aids and the arts, on how to communicate mitigation and adaptation, on how 
to boost long-term and deeper engagement, and on how to communicate the urgency of the 
situation without overwhelming people (Moser, 2010). We need to move away from seeing the 
public as “empty vessels” to fill with knowledge and as poor decision makers, and we need to 
 Katz 20 
demolish the top-down expert to non-expert model of communication (Nerlich, Koteyko, and 
Brown, 2010). Climate change communication needs to move past one-way streams and toward 
dialogic communication (Moser, 2010; Nerlich, Koteyko, and Brown, 2010; Stoknes, 2015). We 
also must put more value in bottom-up, community-focused initiatives and recognize that 
children and young people have incredible capacity to be innovators and motivators (Nerlich, 
Koteyko, and Brown, 2010). 
VI. Methods  
An online survey was distributed on November 1, 2018. It was made with Google Forms. 
I originally sent the survey through email, SMS, and other messaging apps, and posted it on 
social media sites such as Facebook and LinkedIn. The survey was further distributed by 
approximately fifteen other people through a variety of digital means.  
The survey is comprised of seven separate sections; introduction, background 
information, four question sections, and demographics. The introduction includes information 
about me, my research, and the survey. The background information includes definitions of 
climate and climate change. The demographics recorded are age and city/town and country 
where the survey taker resides the majority of the year. The background information and survey 
questions are below. A discussion on the methods behind each section will follow. A discussion 
on the introduction can be found in the Ethics portion of this paper. 
Survey Sections 
Background Information 
The following survey is aimed at assessing how people think about climate change. For the 
purposes of this survey, climate is defined as weather trends over a long period of time, generally 
30 years or so. Climate change refers to modern global warming as a result of human activity.  
 
Question Section 1 
Please choose the statement you agree with the most. 
● The effects of climate change have already begun. 
● The effects of climate change will start within a few years. 
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● The effects of climate change will start within my lifetime. 
● The effects of climate change will not happen in my lifetime, but will affect future 
generations.  
● There will be no effects from climate change. 
 
Please choose the statement you agree with the most. 
● I am informed about climate change. It is happening, it is caused by humans, and we need 
to take action now. 
● I am concerned about climate change, and I know some things about it, but it is not my 
top priority. 
● I think climate change might be an issue, but I am not certain. I believe there are more 
serious issues we should be dealing with right now. 
● I haven’t thought much about climate change. I do not think it is something we need to 
worry about yet, but it might be an issue in the future.  
● If climate change is happening, it is not caused by humans, and it is unlikely to affect 
anything for several decades. 
● Climate change is not happening, it is not a threat to people or the planet, and we do not 
need to take any action. 
 
Question Section 2 
Please list where you think climate change will have the most severe impacts. (You may list 
specific locations and/or characteristics of places. Type "..." if you are unsure.) 
 
Question Section 3 
Please choose the answer that corresponds to how much control you feel you have in your daily 
life at taking action regarding these issues. If you do not believe the issue is important, please 
select the last column. You may leave any questions blank. 
 
Answer options: Completely out of my control, Mostly out of my control, Unsure / No opinion, 
Mostly in my control, Completely in my control, This is not an important issue 
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● Sea level rise 
● Ocean acidification 
● Warming oceans 
● Carbon emissions 
● Melting sea and land ice 
● Extreme weather events and natural disasters 
● Air pollution 
● Ocean pollution 
● Dependence on fossil fuels 
● Overexploitation of natural resources 
● Overpopulation 
● Extinction of species 
● Recycling 
● Composting 
● The amount of trash I produce 
● The amount of plant-based products in my diet 
● The amount of meat in my diet 
● How much I fly 
● How much I drive 
● Eating locally grown food 
● Buying clothes second-hand 
● Supporting large corporations 
● Supporting small businesses 
● Capitalism 
● The amount of single-use plastic I use 
 
Question Section 4 
The following section will ask your level of agreement/disagreement with a series of statements.  
 
Answer options: Strongly Disagree, Disagree, Neither Agree nor Disagree, Agree, Strongly 
Agree 
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● Climate change currently affects where I live. 
● Climate change will affect where I live in the future. 
● Climate change will affect other places more than where I live. 
● Climate change will affect the whole planet equally. 
 
● If the carbon dioxide in the atmosphere were visible, carbon emissions would be seen as a 
bigger problem. 
● I feel that I have access to people who make climate policies. 
● I feel that I have access to people who run large corporations. 
● There are solutions to climate change. 
● I am optimistic about climate change mitigation on a global scale. 
● I am pessimistic about the future of our planet. 
● It is likely we will implement solutions to climate change before it is too late. 
 
● Climate change is an important global issue. 
● Climate change is made out to be a bigger issue than it actually is. 
● Climate change is an issue everyone should care about. 
● Climate change is a social issue. 
● Climate change is a political issue. 
● Climate change is an economic issue. 
● I engage with those who have different viewpoints on climate change than I do. 
● Every time I use coal, oil, or gas, I contribute to climate change 
 
● I try to live as environmentally friendly as I can. 
● I still do things even though I know they are bad for the environment. 
● I do enough to combat climate change given the resources available to me. 
● I could do more to combat climate change given the resources available to me. 
● My social status contributes to how I engage with climate change issues. 
● My economic status contributes to how I engage with climate change issues. 
● My political beliefs contribute to how I engage with climate change issues. 
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● My religious/spiritual beliefs contribute to how I engage with climate change issues. 
Question Discussion 
The goals of this survey were largely inspired by Stoknes’ book, namely the Five D’s. I 
aimed to assess the extent to which these barriers influence people’s perceptions on climate 
change issues, and to see if any trends exist among these perceptions.     
Since the focus of my survey was aimed solely at psychological barriers, I did not include 
questions that assessed educational barriers or educational level. However, I did want to make 
sure that every participant entered the survey with the same baseline level of climate change 
knowledge, which is why I provided short definitions for climate and climate change in the 
Background Information section. I kept these definitions concise so as to minimize reading time, 
and to avoid making people feel as if I were trying to educate them.  
The first question section had two goals: determine how distant in time people perceive 
climate change to be and assess people’s level of concern regarding climate change. These goals 
do not necessarily go hand-in-hand, but the format of these questions lent itself well to their 
combination. The first question tackled the first goal in a fairly simple way; do people think 
climate change is happening now? In the next generation? Never? The second question has a bit 
more beef to it, and pulls from a 2009 Yale study that, after surveying American adults’ attitudes 
toward climate change, divided these attitudes into six groups. The “Six Americas” are The 
Alarmed, The Concerned, The Cautious, The Disengaged, The Doubtful, and The Dismissive 
(Yale Program On Climate Change, 2009). Each answer option in the second question represents 
each of these attitudes. The Alarmed is worried about climate change, is well-informed on the 
subject, and understands that action must be taken now in order to secure the health of our 
planet. The Concerned is worried as well but is only partly informed and does not feel as 
strongly about taking immediate action. The Cautious believes that climate change might be an 
issue, but feels that there are other, more important issues to be dealt with at the moment. The 
Disengaged does not know much, if anything, about climate change, but is open to the possibility 
of it being an issue in the future. The Doubtful does not acknowledge anthropogenic global 
warming, believes all changes are natural, and is sure nothing will be impacted for many years, if 
ever. The Dismissive is an outright denier, is positive climate change is not happening, and does 
not think any action should be taken (Yale Program On Climate Change, 2009).  
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The main goals of the second question section were to assess where people believe the 
most severe impacts of climate change to be, and how distant in space people perceive climate 
change to be. As discussed in the Literature Review, most people believe climate change is 
happening in places far away from where they live, so I wanted to find out where exactly people 
think these changes are occurring. This question was open-ended as opposed to multiple-choice, 
and also placed toward the beginning of the survey, because I did not want to prime people into 
thinking about any specific location.  
 The third question section was aimed at assessing how distant climate change is from 
people’s sense of control. This section included a series of climate change issues of different 
scales and was formatted as a five-point Likert Scale question with an additional sixth option of 
labeling the issue as unimportant. The purpose of including issues of different scales – such as 
warming oceans, which is very large-scale issue, or how much one drives, which is a small-scale 
issue – was to see if any trends exist between how much control one feels they have and the scale 
of the issue. Additionally, the issues in this section were randomly shuffled for each survey taker 
so as to not group the issues of similar scales together as I had inputted them. 
 The fourth and final question section was meant to assess the remaining barriers, as well 
as the barriers already touched upon. This section was formatted as a five-point Likert Scale 
question as well and was divided into four subsections so that the scale was visible at the top of 
each section (Google Forms does not allow for a scrolling scale). These subsections were 
unlabeled and were primarily divided arbitrarily by number of questions. However, the first 
subsection targets distance, the second distance and doom, the third distance, denial and identity, 
and the fourth dissonance and identity.    
VII. Ethics 
All participants were informed of my identity and institutional affiliations on the first 
page of the survey. The survey introduction also explained the general purpose of my research, 
the survey's overall format, and that participants’ identities would remain unknown. My email 
was also provided; participants were encouraged to reach out with questions, concerns, or to ask 
for a copy of my final paper. Participants were required to check a box to agree to participate in 
the survey. Additionally, it was made clear that participants were able to exit the survey at any 
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point and that their answers would not be recorded if they did not press submit on the final page 
of the survey.  
Since I was distributing the survey through social media and other social networks, my 
main concern in writing this survey was that soliciting too much demographic information would 
enable me to identify individual survey takers (or that they would think I might be able to do so). 
Still, I wanted to obtain enough demographic information for analysis. The solution to this 
concern was collecting only age and town/city of residence. Another concern I had about the 
introduction was providing enough detail to properly inform people of the purpose of the 
research without influencing their answers. Because of this concern, I chose to title the survey 
simply “Climate Change Survey” and used the phrasing “how people think about climate 
change” instead of “psychological barriers to response.” 
VIII. Selected Survey Results 
 The following section contains a handful of selected charts and graphs to be discussed in 
section IX. The full set of data can be found in the Appendix at the end of the paper. 
 
Question Section 1, Question 1 
 
Figure 2. 
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Question Section 1, Question 2 
 
Figure 3. 
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Question Section 2 
Figure 4. 
 
 
Figure 5. 
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Question Section 3, Large-Scale Issue 
 
Figure 6. 
 
Question Section 3, Small-Scale Issue 
 
Figure 7. 
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Question Section 3, Unevenly Distributed Issues 
 
Figure 8. 
 
 
Figure 9. 
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Question Section 4, Distance 
 
Figure 10. 
 
Question Section 4, Doom 
 
Figure 11. 
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Question Section 4, Dissonance 
 
Figure 12. 
 
Question Section 4, Denial 
 
Figure 13. 
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Question Section 4, iDentity 
 
Figure 14. 
IX. Analysis and Discussion 
The intention of collecting demographic information was to analyze potential trends 
between those demographics and responses. However, there is not enough variation in these data 
to provide meaningful analysis. The majority of participants are located in and around my 
hometown and college town, and the majority of participants are between 15 and 23 years old, 
with almost a quarter of total responses coming from 20-year-olds. These results are not 
surprising, as the modes of survey distribution reached largely into my own social circle, and 
into social circles of similar demographics to mine. Because of this, all survey data presented is 
trends within individual questions.  
The first question section set out to assess how distant in time people perceive climate 
change to be, and what people’s attitudes on climate change are. Results from the first question, 
seen in Figure 2, are unanimous: all survey takers agree that the effects of climate change have 
already begun. Results from the second question in this section, seen in Figure 3, show that the 
vast majority of participants either fall into The Alarmed or The Concerned attitude groups 
outlined by the Yale Program On Climate Change, which is consistent with responses from the 
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first question (2009). However, one participant chose the answer corresponding to The 
Disengaged attitude group, and one participant chose the answer corresponding to The Doubtful 
attitude group. These responses clash with the unanimity from the first question, as people who 
fall under these categories do not believe that climate change is a current issue, rather something 
that, for The Disengaged, might be an issue in the future, and for The Doubtful, will likely never 
be an issue (Yale Program On Climate Change, 2009). One potential explanation for this 
discrepancy is that the first question did not specify whether I meant natural climate change or 
anthropogenic climate change. Perhaps these two participants are unsure whether or not climate 
change is naturally occurring or manmade. However, I provided a definition of climate change at 
the beginning of the survey, before participants began answering questions, which explained that 
any references to climate change in the survey are references to anthropogenic climate change. It 
is also likely that participants did not agree with this definition or skimmed past it. 
The goal of the second question section was to assess where people believe the most 
severe effects of climate change will occur, and if this had anything to do with the spatial 
distance barrier. Since I did not perform any analysis on these data other than displaying trends, 
there will be no spatial distance analysis. Figure 4 shows the distribution of coding occurrences. 
Nine participants either left this question blank or did not understand the question correctly, so 
these data were discarded. This means that the data shown from this section are from 148 
responses, whereas all other sections include data from 156 responses. For a full list of codes and 
meanings, please reference the Appendix. Codes that occur between 1 and 10 times were Ind, 
ME, POC, SEA, Aus, SH, BioD, HA, NR, US, Af, D, Pop, WS, and F. Codes that occur between 
11 and 20 times are DC, Eq, I, Ex, and LE. Codes that occur between 21 and 30 times are LSE, 
O, and Ev. Codes that occur between 31 and 40 times are Ice and P. The only code that occurs 
more than 41 times is C with 72 occurrences. These data show that coastal locations, polar 
regions, and ice systems are the most commonly referenced locations regarding climate change 
impacts. The whole planet, ocean systems, and places of low socioeconomic status were the 
three next most common. I additionally sorted the codes by four themes: geographic regions, 
vulnerable populations, ecosystems, and regional characteristics. Distribution of codes within 
themes can be found in the Appendix. As shown in Figure 5, almost half of the codes are related 
to ecosystems, and over a quarter are related to geographic regions. This suggests that when 
thinking of climate change and its effects, people might be more likely to think of specific 
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geographic locations or ecosystems, rather than about specific groups or people or broader types 
of locations.  
The third question section aimed to assess how much control people feel that they have in 
their daily lives regarding climate change issues of different scales. For the majority of this 
section, responses were as predicted: large-scale issues skew toward feelings of lack of control, 
and small-scale issues skew toward more control. The example shown in Figure 6 is ocean 
acidification, one of the large-scale issues. The majority of participants feel that ocean 
acidification is mostly out of their control, and the next largest group of participants feel that the 
issue is completely out of their control. Most of the other large-scale issues included in this 
section follow a similar skew trend, including sea level rise, warming oceans, melting land and 
sea ice, extreme weather events and natural disasters, air pollution, ocean pollution, dependence 
on fossil fuels, overexploitation of natural resources, overpopulation, extinction of species, and 
capitalism. It is interesting to point out that the question on capitalism generated eight responses 
of “This is not an important issue,” which is the largest amount of responses any question 
generated. 
Most of the small-scale issues had a similar skew toward feelings of control. The 
example shown in Figure 7 is the amount of meat in participants’ diets, which is a small-scale 
issue. As seen in this figure, the majority of participants feel that this issue is completely in their 
control, and many others feel that this issue is mostly in their control. Most of the other small-
scale issues follow a similar skew trend, including recycling, composting, the amount of trash 
participants produce, how often participants drive, eating locally grown food, buying clothes 
second-hand, supporting small businesses, the amount of plant-based products in participants’ 
diets, and the amount of single use plastic participants use. It is interesting to point out that the 
questions on the amount of meat and the amount of plant-based products in participants’ diets 
were the only other two questions that generated eight responses of “This is not an important 
issue.” 
Two issues do not have obvious skew trends, which are supporting large corporations and 
carbon emissions, and can be seen in Figures 8 and 9. While Figure 8 shows a small majority of 
participants leaning toward feelings of control, a large portion of participants still felt that 
supporting large corporations is out of their control. While Figure 9 shows a small majority of 
participants leaning toward lack of control, a large portion of participants still feel that carbon 
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emissions are in their control. I expected the data for supporting large corporations to follow a 
similar skew trend to the rest of the small-scale issues, and the data for carbon emissions to 
follow a similar skew trend to the rest of the large-scale issues. However, I see how these two 
issues may not have been interpreted as intended. While individuals are often able to choose 
which brands they support and which companies they purchase from, it can also be very difficult 
to escape the monopolies of large corporations, thus rendering this issue both small-scale and 
large-scale. Carbon emissions can easily be seen as both small-scale and large-scale, as well, 
especially because I failed to specify if this question was asking about carbon emissions on a 
national or global scale or at a personal scale.  
 For the fourth question section, I chose to highlight one graph for each of the Five D’s. 
For Distance, I chose data for the statement “Climate change will affect other places more than 
where I live.” As seen in Figure 10, 85% of participants either agreed or strongly agreed with 
this statement, which shows that, among the people who took my survey, most see climate 
change as spatially distant. This is not surprising, as the majority of participants are from 
suburban and urban Chicago and Philadelphia, regions which have yet to see any severe impacts 
from climate change. For Doom, I chose data for the statement “I am optimistic about climate 
mitigation on a global scale.” As seen in Figure 11, 62% of participants either disagree or 
strongly disagree, and another 20% are neutral. Only 18% agree with this statement, while none 
felt strong agreement. For Dissonance, I chose data for the statement “I still do things even 
though I know they are bad for the environment.” As seen in Figure 12, an overwhelming 
majority of participants, 86% either agree or strongly agree with this statement. For Denial, I 
chose data for the statement “Climate change is an important global issue.” This statement 
garnered the most consistent responses out of any other question in the survey, with 90% of 
participants either agreeing or strongly agreeing, shown in Figure 13. For iDentity, I chose data 
for the statement, “My political beliefs contribute to how I engage with climate change issues.” 
While the majority (63%) of participants agreed with this statement, 19% also felt neutral about 
the issue, which can be seen in Figure 14.  
While these five examples do not perfectly embody trends for other questions in the five 
categories, they, along with data from the first three question sections, do a good job showing 
general trends. Overall, four out of the five psychological barriers to climate change response 
exist (to varying degrees) for the people who took my survey. The majority of participants see 
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climate change as being distant in many respects. Large-scale issues are distant from people’s 
control, as evidenced by Figure 6 and the rest of the discussion on the third question section. 
Both Figure 6 and Figure 10 show that climate change is spatially distant. Appendix data shows 
that climate change is also socially distant and distant from participants’ senses as well. 
However, Figure 2 shows that climate change is not distant in time, as all participants believe the 
effects of climate change are already occurring.  
While many participants believe that there are solutions to climate change, as seen in 
Appendix data, many do not believe that these solutions will be implemented in time to save the 
planet; many participants are not optimistic about climate mitigation, as seen in Figure 11. This 
supports the existence of Doom as a psychological barrier.  
Dissonance can also be seen strongly; Figure 12 and Appendix data show that many 
people still harm the environment and contribute to climate change despite knowing the weight 
of their actions. 
The fourth barrier represented in my data is iDentity, although different identities 
contribute to different degrees. Political beliefs, as shown in Figure 14, contribute to how the 
majority of participants interact with climate change issues. Social status and economic status 
contribute as well, as seen in Appendix data. However, religious and spiritual beliefs do not 
contribute as much as other identities do, also seen in Appendix data. 
One barrier, Denial, is not supported in my data. As shown by the overwhelming 
evidence in Figure 2 and Figure 13, participants do not deny that climate change is happening, 
and in fact strongly believe it is happening now.  
It is hard to say if these data are representative of just my social circle, or if they stretch 
beyond it. Regardless, these data strongly point toward the existence of psychological barriers to 
climate change, which means that communicators do need to continue to use strategies that 
bypass and fight against these barriers.  
X. Conclusion 
The future of our planet lies in research, action, and policy. The foundation of 
psychological knowledge had been lain for, in many cases, over a decade. We know what we 
need to do to better communicate climate change, so why are we still using scare tactics, fear 
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mongering, and alarmist strategies, or hard facts, unemotional data, and faceless graphs? From 
the research presented and from my survey results, it is clear that psychological barriers to 
climate change response exist. But we need to move the focus beyond the fact that people have a 
difficult time responding to climate change and instead focus on communication strategies that 
emphasize hope, positivity, conversation, and a better future; ones that elicit response. 
Researchers should continue to study the climate change communication process as a whole but 
must also run studies that address specific communication methods and their effectiveness. 
Additionally, since climate change cannot be everyone’s top priority, as not everyone has the 
resources available to help mitigate it, I am calling upon those with the power to act to help build 
a better future. To effectively communicate climate change is to compel people to act. And 
people need to act now. These actions should begin on a personal, small-scale level. However, 
they must be accompanied by policy changes that support, encourage, and further individual and 
local action, and policy that removes infrastructural constraints that prevent people from acting 
(Moser, 2010; Nerlich, Koteyko, and Brown, 2010). 
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XII. Appendix 
Question Section 1 
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Question Section 2 
Full list of codes 
Code Meaning of Code Number of Responses 
Af Africa 5 
Aus Australia 2 
BioD Places with high biodiversity 3 
C Coastlines, coastal cities, and other coastal communities 72 
D Deserts 5 
DC Developing countries 12 
Eq Equatorial regions 15 
Ev Everywhere; the whole planet 28 
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Ex 
Regions with extreme environmental conditions; this 
includes regions with extreme temperatures and extreme 
weather events 
17 
F Forests, including rainforests and jungles 6 
HA Regions of high elevation 3 
I Islands 16 
Ice 
Ice systems, including ice caps, land ice, sea ice, and 
glaciers 
33 
Ind Indigenous populations 1 
LE 
Places with low elevation; this includes regions below sea-
level 
17 
LSE Regions of low socioeconomic status 25 
ME The Middle East 1 
NR 
Regions/communities reliant on natural resources, 
including agricultural regions 
4 
O Ocean systems 26 
P Polar regions and other high latitude regions 40 
POC People of color 1 
Pop 
Highly/densely populated regions (both human and non-
human) 
5 
SEA Southeast Asia 1 
SH The southern hemisphere 2 
US Regions in the United States 4 
WS 
Water-stressed communities (this includes communities 
with limited access to clean water as well as drought-ridden 
regions and regions prone to floods) 
5 
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Codes by theme 
Theme Codes Number of Occurrences 
Geographic Regions 
Af, Aus, Eq, Ev, ME, P, SEA, 
SH, US 
98 
Vulnerable Populations DC, Ind, LSE, NR, POC, WS 48 
Ecosystems C, D, F, Ice, I, O 158 
Regional Characteristics BioD, Ex, HA, LE, Pop 45 
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